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THE RELATIONSHIP OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXES 
TO TOXIC WASTES: A SELECTIVE STUDY 
Richard A. Westin* and Sanford E. Gaines** 
I. ORIENTATION 
Every year, American industry generates about 250 million tons 
of wastes considered hazardous to human health and the en-
vironment. 1 Some hazardous waste is industrial wastewater, 
which generators treat and then discharge into rivers, lakes, and 
bays, leading to toxic contamination of many water bodies. 2 Some 
of the waste is incinerated,3 emitting small amounts of toxic 
substances into the atmosphere. 4 Under current and past prac-
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Columbia University; J.D., 1972, University of Pennsylvania. 
** Associate Professor & Director, Environmental Liability Law Program, University of 
Houston Law Center. A.B., 1967, M.A., 1974, J.D., 1974, Harvard. The authors gratefully 
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1 Recent estimates range from 247 to 266 million tons depending on how the estimate was 
made and what wastes were included. THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT: A VIEW TOWARD THE NINETIES 158-65 (1987) [hereinafter STATE OF THE 
ENVIRONMENT]. Even as a legal matter the definition of hazardous waste varies in context. 
Compare Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a) (1982) 
(defines hazardous waste in terms of toxicity, persistence, degradability, flammability, and 
corrosiveness) with Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (defines hazardous substances 
in terms of lists of substances under various environmental statutes). 
2 According to one study, 22% of hazardous wastes are released to sewers or surface waters. 
STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 1, at 165 (citing a study by the Congressional 
Budget Office). 
3 In 1983, the estimate was one percent but that figure has probably increased as land 
disposal has been restricted. Id. 
4 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 264.343 (1987) (permits small quantities of toxic emissions). See also 
Nash, Assessing the Health Risks From Municipal Waste Incineration: An Example From 
Philadelphia, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REVIEW, Sept. 1987, at 249. 
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tices, the largest portion of hazardous waste ends up in land-
fills, where it remains a potential environmental threat for decades 
to come. 5 
With the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)6 in 1976, Congress began to regulate the disposal of haz-
ardous waste. It followed this initiative in 1980 with the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or Superfund), 7 which tackled the problem of cleaning 
old waste sites. In their original form, both solid waste laws reflected 
a technological optimism that the country could safely continue pro-
fligate production of waste materials so long as it applied better 
technology (like double liners in landfills) and cleaned up the old, 
abandoned dumps. 
In the 1980s, it became apparent to Congress that no disposal 
systems could guarantee perpetual containment. Regulation of treat-
ment and disposal of waste, while important, was therefore simply 
not enough. As a result, Congress broadened the attack and shifted 
the focus from palliative to preventive measures. For example, the 
1984 amendments to RCRA 8 promote treatment and destruction of 
hazardous waste through a phased-in prohibition of land disposal of 
most untreated wastes. 9 They also promote steps by manufacturers 
to minimize the generation of hazardous waste by industrial pro-
cesses. 10 In 1986, Congress increased funding for the "Superfund" 
waste site clean-up program five-fold, to a targeted level of $8.5 
billion for the period 1986-90. 11 Two years later, in keeping with the 
new emphasis on treatment of currently generated waste, Congress 
redirected waste site cleanup from the practice of simple removal to 
5 The Congressional Budget Office and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency each 
estimated in the early 1980s that at least two thirds of hazardous waste was disposed of on 
land. STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note I, at 165. 
642 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & West Supp. 1988). 
742 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982, Supp. IV 1986 & West SUpp. 1988). 
8 The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991(i) (West SUpp. 1988)). 
942 U.S.C. § 6924(d}-(g) (Supp. IV 1986) (land disposal prohibition); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m) 
(Supp. IV 1986) (no prohibition for treated wastes). The Environmental Protection Agency 
has begun to implement provisions through regulation. E.g., 53 Fed. Reg. 30,908 (1988) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 148); id. 31,138 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 264, 265, 266, 
268 and 271). 
10 C. HARRIS, W. WANT & M. WARD, HAZARDOUS WASTE: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE 
162-66 (1987) (describing section 224 of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984). 
11 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
100 Stat. 1613, § 11l(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (amending CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1982)). 
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a more secure landfill toward a clear preference for permanent treat-
ment or destruction of the waste material. 12 
Many states have been equally aggressive about trying to dis-
courage simple waste disposal. 13 Some states have even attempted 
to restrict the flow of hazardous waste into their territory.14 Local 
governments have often adopted similar restrictions15 spurred on by 
increasingly vociferous citizens who unabashedly embrace the "not-
in-my-back-yard," or NIMBY, philosophy.16 
More demanding federal regulation, universal local opposition to 
waste treatment and disposal facilities, and increased long-term li-
abilities for waste sites have substantially restricted the supply of 
licensed waste handlers17 and have sharply increased the costs of 
waste disposal. 18 As a result of increased costs and downstream 
liabilities for cleanup, industrial generators have begun to examine 
more closely their waste management practices and opportunities 
12 SARA § 121(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b) (Supp. IV 1986). 
13 E.g., California Hazardous Waste Control Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-
25250 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989); New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.IE-1 to -135 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988). 
14 Efforts to ban all importation of out-of-state hazardous waste have fallen under commerce 
clause challenges. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). Strict state 
regulations and taxation of waste generation and disposal, however, have generally survived 
challenges based on the supremacy clause or on federal preemption grounds. See, e.g., Exxon 
Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526, 543-44, 481 A.2d 271, 280-81 (1984); see also CAL. VEH. CODE 
§§ 31303-31304 (West Supp. 1989). But see Rollins Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 
775 F.2d 627, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1985). 
15 See, e.g., ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD., CODE § 11-408(g)-(i) (1979); see also Browning-
Ferris Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 292 Md. 136, 438 A.2d 269 (Ct. App. 1981) (upheld 
certain features of the county ordinance to control hazardous waste through transport and 
disposal requirements). 
16 Lester, EPA Says: Build a New Superfund Site or Lose Money to Cleanup the Ones 
You've Got, 6 EVERYONE'S BACK YARD (Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste) Spring 
1988, at 8. The very title of this publication from a citizens grass roots organization alludes 
positively to the NIMBY-"Not In My Back Yard"-philosophy. For a discussion of the 
NIMBY syndrome, see Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive 
Justice, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 437 (1988). 
17 "In the United States, the number of active, land-based hazardous waste sites has dropped 
by two-thirds over the last [1986-87] year because of failure to meet deadlines for complying 
with operating requirements. The nation's 13 commercial incinerators are operating at 90 
percent of capacity; local opposition makes siting new facilities extremely difficult." S. POSTEL, 
DEFUSING THE TOXICS THREAT: CONTROLLING PESTICIDES AND INDUSTRIAL WASTE 40-41 
(Worldwatch Institute, Paper No. 79, 1987). 
18 "As demand outpaces supply and as tighter regulations are placed on disposal technolo-
gies, waste management costs are rising rapidly. Landfill prices have skyrocketed to $240 per 
ton, a 16-fold increase since the early [1970s]. Incineration of organics now costs between $500 
and $1,200 per ton. Waste management costs for DuPont, the nation's largest chemical 
producer, now exceed $100 million annually." Id. at 41. 
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they may have to reduce the amount of hazardous waste they gen-
erate. 19 
Waste comprises all non-product hazardous outputs from an in-
dustrial operation into all environmental media, even though such 
outputs may be within permitted or licensed limits.20 Waste reduc-
tion focuses on "in-plant practices that reduce, avoid, or eliminate 
the generation of hazardous waste so as to reduce risks to health 
and the environment. "21 The strategies available for reducing waste 
include using different raw materials in production, modifying pro-
duction technology, operations, and procedures, recycling waste 
within plants, and redesigning end-products. 22 
Although market forces have begun to modify industrial behavior, 
many policy analysts find the pace of improvements in waste treat-
ment and waste reduction unacceptably slow. Looking ahead to the 
next decade, they point out the ultimate futility of treating waste 
disposal as a single issue of land use or water pollution, and recom-
mend that the private and public sectors alike move toward an 
integrated approach to waste management and waste minimization. 23 
Politicians, industrialists, academicians, and ordinary citizens share 
the perception that hazardous waste is a pressing national problem 
and urge that it be solved.24 
Reduction of waste at the source has gained special attention as a 
promising adjunct to the statutory policies for proper disposal and 
cleanup of old wastes. The congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment has prepared two studies on waste reduction. One of these 
19 Strelow & Claussen, Liability Management in Practice: Waste Generators, 25 Hous. L. 
REV. 943 (1988). 
20 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ITE·317, SERIOUS REDUC-
TION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AND INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY 3 
(1986) [hereinafter SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS W ASTEj. 
21 [d. 
22 The Office of Technology Assessment cites immediate pratical measures such as mechan-
ical polishing of metals rather than polishing with solvents, and substituting water-based 
solutions for those that use hydrocarbon-based solvents. [d. at 4. 
23 THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT 
MID DECADE 11-12, 319-21 (1984). See also SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, 
supra note 20, at 5. 
24 See, e.g., STEERING COMMITTEE ON HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP, THE CONSERVATION 
FOUNDATION CLEAN SITES AND PRIVATE ACTION: A PLAN TO ACCELERATE PRIVATE HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP 7-10 (1984) (the Steering Committee included industrial leaders, 
heads of citizen environmental organizations, and two former public officials); Biden, A New 
Direction for Environmental Policy: Hazardous Waste Prevention, Not Disposal, 17 Envtl. 
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10400 (1987); C. HARRIS, W. WANT & M. WARD, supra note 10, at 
8-15. 
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studies espouses the concept of source reduction;25 the other pro-
poses government research, support, and regulation to promote it.26 
Academic researchers have studied the European approach to waste 
management, and have found many of their legal and technological 
waste reduction strategies applicable in the American context. 27 The 
studies conclude that government regulation and public financial 
support have their role in waste reduction, but private industry 
inevitably bears primary responsibility for product and process 
changes to reduce the volume and toxicity of waste. 
The urgent need to marshall the full range of industrial strategies 
to achieve significant reduction in the amount and toxicity of haz-
ardous waste and the environmentally sound treatment of residual 
wastes suggests the need to investigate whether the economic in-
centives embodied in the tax code harmonize with the national haz-
ardous waste management policy or set up dissonances with the 
policy that discourage private cooperation. 28 This Article probes the 
extent to which federal taxes, as reflected in the Internal Revenue 
Code of 198629 (the Code) and elsewhere, are compatible or incom-
patible with federal environmental policies with respect to hazardous 
wastes. 30 
After a brief discussion in Part II of the lack of specific environ-
mental policy input into the drafting of tax legislation, this Article 
proceeds in Part III to the analysis of the Code provisions affecting 
firms' management of wastes and their associated risks. This analysis 
is organized according to the general character of the industrial 
25 See SERIOUS REDUCTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 20. 
26 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-ITE-347, FROM POLLUTION 
TO PREVENTION: A PROGRESS REPORT ON WASTE REDUCTION-SPECIAL REPORT (1987); see 
also Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-based Incentives: Financial Responsi-
bility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403 (1986). 
27 B. PIASECKI & G. DAVIS, AMERICA'S FUTURE IN TOXIC WASTE MANAGEMENT: LESSONS 
FROM EUROPE (1987). 
28 This Article should not be taken to suggest that tax policy should be used affirmatively 
to promote non-revenue goals. We take no position here on that controversial question. Even 
viewing the tax code as exclusively a revenue policy statement, however, it remains relevant 
to inquire whether the code works at cross purposes to other social policies, and to suggest 
changes that would make the code at least "policy neutral." 
29 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9602 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section references are to the 1986 Internal 
Revenue Code unless otherwise indicated. 
30 The domestic focus avoids many difficult issues that would greatly complicate the analysis. 
For example, it may be timely to suggest that tax benefits should be withdrawn for imports 
that entail damage to the entire planet, such as products that release chlorofluorocarbons that 
deplete the vital ozone layer. Additional tax issues arise with respect to export activities that 
may affect the environment of other countries. These questions deserve research and analysis, 
but are simply beyond the scope of this Article. 
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activity affected. Section A deals with the general policy underlying 
tax deductions. Section B deals with the specifics of industrial op-
erations, including the tax treatment of raw materials, or feedstocks, 
that are introduced into the production process and tax incentives 
related to changes in industrial processes and new production tech-
nologies. Section C discusses the tax treatment of waste disposal, 
including both pollution control equipment to treat waste before 
release to the environment, as well as ultimate waste disposal. Fi-
nally, section D considers tax effects on the expenses and insurance 
or capital accumulations to cover liabilities that may accrue to firms 
after disposal of waste. 
II. TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
In spite of the heightened awareness of environmental issues and 
Congress's detailed legislation in the past twenty years on a vast 
range of environmental issues, the legislative process for writing tax 
law3I still has no systematic environmental input. The Constitution 
calls for tax legislation to begin in the House of Representatives 
and, implicitly, to move to the Senate and to the Executive for 
approval or veto. 32 In fact, such legislation commonly originates in 
the Executive Branch, goes to both houses of Congress, and invar-
iably goes into a House-Senate conference before being revoted by 
the House and Senate. Hearings mayor may not be called. 
An army of experts interacts with any tax legislation. The Ad-
ministration has its own experts, particularly in the Office of Tax 
Legislative Counsel33 and the Congress has expert staffs at the 
House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee 
levels. In addition, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation 
operates continuously regardless of legislative activity in the year. 34 
Yet nowhere in the system does a particular official, committee, or 
other entity have the assignment to evaluate tax legislation from an 
environmental perspective. 
The ad hoc nature of the relationship between federal tax legis-
lation and environmental concerns suggests the need to subject the 
environmental impact of tax legislation to mandatory thoughtful 
evaluation and comments. Two avenues to implement such a change 
31 See generally Surrey, The Federal Tax Legislative Process, 31 REC. A.B. CITY OF NEW 
YORK 515 (1976); Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 
VA. L. REV. 1389 (1972). 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. 
33 A segment of the Treasury DepartlJ'ent. 
34 See Washington Report: The Joint Committee on Taxation, 11 TAX ADVISOR 181 (1980). 
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exist in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).35 One av-
enue is the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the office of 
the President. 36 CEQ should advise the President and Secretary of 
the Treasury on environmental effects of the tax code. The other 
avenue is NEPA's requirement for an environmental impact state-
ment on all proposals for legislative action,37 a requirement that 
observers have called NEPA's "neglected mandate. "38 
In both cases, however, the environmental impact assessment 
mandate applies to the Executive Branch only,39 and would not affect 
the congressional end of the legislative process. Congress has sub-
stantial expertise available on environmental affairs. To bring this 
expertise to bear on the analysis of tax legislation, however, would 
require rules changes and perhaps increased staff. Because most tax 
legislation actually originates in the Executive Branch, a strict ap-
plication of NEPA therefore appears to be the more effective ap-
proach. 
III. TAX CODE TREATMENT OF TOXIC WASTES 
A. Public Policy Limitation on Deductions 
1. The Limitation in General 
All tax deductions were once subject to the so-called "public policy 
limitation," the gist of which was to disallow a deduction in any 
instance in which allowing the deduction would frustrate a sharply 
defined governmental policy.40 That limitation remains embedded in 
the Code. Thus, for example, deductions for casualty losses,41 losses 
from extraordinary obsolescence,42 and depreciation43 continue to be 
35 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 
1986). 
36 I d. § 4342. 
37Id. § 4332(2)(C). 
38 F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW 
AND POLICY 718 (1984). The tax legislative process has two separate phases. One entails 
drafting changes in tax law, both to improve the tax code and to raise appropriate levels of 
revenue. The second entails appropriating funds. In Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 
(1979), the Supreme Court held that NEPA does not apply to appropriations legislation. 
Because the tax law writing process necessitates amendments to the United States Code, 
however, it is inherently substantive in nature and therefore warrants environmental impact 
analysis under NEPA. 
39 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2). 
40 See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). 
41 r. R. C. § 165 (1986). 
42Id. 
43Id. §§ 167-168. 
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affected by this limitation. The major exception to the public policy 
limitation is the narrower limitation on trade or business expense 
deductions (section 162) and investment-related expense deductions 
(section 212). For these types of expenses, sections 162 and 212 
provide an exclusive short list of circumstances that bar deductions 
on public policy grounds, namely, certain payments for legislative 
activities, illegal bribes and kickbacks, treble damages payments 
under the anti-trust laws, and fines and penalties. 44 Sections 162 and 
212 are otherwise free of moralizing. 
Section 162 is the workhorse of the Code. It permits deductions 
for wages, salaries, rents, and the day-to-day costs of running a 
business. 45 The very breadth of section 162 greatly narrows the 
public policy limitations on business expense deductions because it 
makes most business deductions legitimate. Still, some residual en-
vironmental issues might be the subject of later tax controversies 
not involving section 162. For example, the public policy limitation 
should apply to claims for depreciation (otherwise deductible under 
sections 167 or 168) of conduit or pipe used to direct unpermitted 
discharge of toxic wastes into a river, or to disallow deductions for 
losses resulting from the unlawful abandonment of dump sites laden 
with hazardous materials. The fact that some depreciation expenses 
may violate public policy appears to have eluded the detection of the 
commentators. Given the paucity of administrative or judicial guid-
ance, taxpayers cannot be expected to impose the public policy lim-
itation on themselves in preparing their tax returns. 
This observation has important implications for waste policy. If 
taxpayers are not barred from claiming deductions for environmen-
tally destructive business behavior, it amounts to a Code subsidy for 
facially illegitimate behavior. A student of the tax laws will not be 
surprised; the purpose of the Code is to raise revenue, subject only 
to a few broad theoretical constraints, one of which is that busi-
nesses, good or evil, should be taxed on their net incomes. 46 Because 
ill-gotten gains are taxed, the costs of producing such gains are 
generally deductible provided they are "ordinary and necessary," a 
term used in sections 162 and 212. 
"N ecessary" means appropriate and helpful to earning money. 47 
Virtually any business-related expenditure qualifies under this stan-
44 [d. § 162; Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (1988). 
45 I. R. C. § 162(a). 
46 See B. BITTKER & M. McMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 
~ 2.1 (1988). 
47 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933). 
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dard. 48 "Ordinary" is generally interpreted to mean "not capital in 
nature," that is, short-term in nature,49 although there is also modest 
authority for the proposition that ordinary means "not strange. "50 
The notion that ordinary means "not strange" is sometimes used 
to strike down deductions that for some reason or other offend a 
court. 51 A court might dredge it up to deny a section 162 deduction 
on sufficiently egregious facts, for instance, to deny deductions for 
the costs of unlawfully carting off and dumping toxic wastes. There 
is apparently no decision on point with respect to environmental 
issues, so this occasional interpretation of "ordinary" has been of no 
value in the campaign to diminish the attractions of engaging in 
environmentally unsound actions. Because of its rare use in only 
extreme cases, it seems destined to remain a weak weapon. 
The amorality of the Code should not be exaggerated. In numerous 
particular instances, the Code denies business deductions for nor-
mative reasons to foster policies of less than overwhelming concern. 
For example, net wagering losses are disallowed even though the 
taxpayer might be a professional gambler. 52 Similarly, losses on the 
disposition of certain unregistered securities are barred53 and the 
costs of broadcasting ads into the United States are nondeductible 
if transmitted from a country with a corresponding rule. 54 The Code 
subjects producers and disposers of hazardous wastes to no such 
limitations, however. While it is not surprising to find that section 
162 has not been applied to deny deductions for environmentally 
unsound behavior, the failure to do so is puzzling when less signifi-
cant norms have already upset the generalization that any short-
lived cost of generating taxable income is currently deductible. 
Even though Congress has failed to harness the Code to discour-
age environmentally unsound business practices, it is possible that 
the courts could use the existing Code to disallow deductions for 
environmentally destructive expenditures. To do so, however, judi-
cial interpretation of section 162 of the Code would have to be 
conspicuously "stretched." At present, the Code effectively encour-
ages unsound practices. Similarly, other less significant Code sec-
tions (most notably that for losses)55 could be, but have not been, 
48 See 1 B.BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS, ~ 201.1 (1981). 
49 Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966). 
50 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1933). 
51 See, e.g., Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984). 
52 l.R.C. § 165(d) (1986). But see Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987) (min-
imum tax). 
53 l.R.C. § 165(j) (1986). 
54 I d. § 162(j). 
55Id. § 165. 
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interpreted to prevent deductions for environmentally undesirable 
behavior. 
2. The Deductibility of Punitive Damages 
The Code does not prohibit the deduction of punitive damages, 
except for treble damages under the anti-trust laws. 56 In other 
words, section 162 does not bar a deduction for paying punitive 
damages for egregious behavior in connection with environmental 
malfeasance. Allowing tax deductions when punitive damages are 
assessed for environmental misconduct leading to personal injuries, 
however, represents questionable policy. While it does not positively 
encourage bad acts, the deduction certainly mitigates the sting of 
judicial sanctions for acts such as negligent spills of dioxin-tainted 
wastes. Even if judges and juries take deductions into account when 
fixing the amount of damages,57 they will be unaware of the partic-
ular judgment-creditor's tax burden, making any judicial tax ac-
counting haphazard. 
The question of punitive damages for environmental malfeasance 
has raised considerable controversy. 58 The Code should prohibit de-
ductibility for several reasons. If not deductible, the financial burden 
of the liability will be uniform, regardless of the payor's tax posture. 
In addition, withdrawing the deduction will operate as an unqualified 
disincentive for all taxpayers. Finally, legislative policy and judicial 
action seem to regard environmental malfeasance as more socially 
reprehensible than anti-trust conspiracies. 59 Consequently, section 
162(g) should be expanded to disallow deduction for punitive dam-
ages for such behavior. 
3. Illegal Payments 
Illegal bribes and kickbacks are nondeductible. 60 Prohibiting de-
ductions for such expenses covers specific circumstances in environ-
56Id. § 162(g). 
57 Empirical evidence on this question appears to be lacking. 
5" See 2 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 26-27 (June 3, 1987). Most such awards have come in cases 
brought on a products liability theory. Proposed federal legislation, H.R. 1115, lOOth Cong., 
2d Sess. (1987), would make it more difficult for courts to impose such damages. Id. 
59 See 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 584 (June 12, 1987). At a time when antitrust enforcement is 
declining, environmental enforcement, including criminal prosecution, is increasing in response 
to public attitudes. Id. 
60 LR.C. § 162(c)(I) (1986). 
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mental affairs such as bribes paid to an environmental agency in-
vestigator. 61 
A broader provision, section 162(c)(2), denies trade or business 
deductions for "other illegal payments," meaning payments to any 
person if it is a bribe, kickback, or other illegal payment under any 
federal law or any state law, provided the state law is generally 
enforced and subjects the payor to criminal penalty or loss of license 
to engage in a trade or business, whether or not imposed on the 
taxpayer. 62 The key question under section 162(c)(2) is what the term 
"illegal payment" means. The regulations63 provide no practical guid-
ance, and there seems to be no other interpretive authority. 64 
Section 162(c)(2) will not likely carry much weight with respect to 
environmental issues. The cases arising under it concentrate on 
payments that in and of themselves violate the law, such as "payola"65 
and payments that fall below legal minimums. 66 Given the broad 
wording of the statute, one might expect a broader application of 
"other illegal payment" to sweep in payments that arise in connection 
with an illegal act. Unfortunately, interpretations of the provision 
do not support such an application. 
The weakness of the provision is clear. It covers only payments 
that are in themselves proscribed, rather than payments arising in 
connection with illegal acts. Thus, if a manufacturer pays a trucking 
company to haul hazardous waste illegally, section 162(c)(2) cannot 
apply because the typical statute is geared toward the immediate 
act (dumping wastes), not the payment of money to induce bad acts. 
To solve this oversight, Congress could easily expand section 
162(c)(2) to cover payment in consideration for illegal acts. 
B. Tax Treatment of Raw Materials and Feedstocks 
1. Percentage Depletion 
Although the terms "toxic substances" and "hazardous waste" 
conjure up thoughts of synthetic chemicals, many of the most heavily 
used and most toxic substances are naturally occurring minerals, 
61Id. 
62Id. § 162(c)(2). Again, the burden of proof is on the IRS. Id. 
63 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18 (1988). 
64 The debate so far has concentrated on whether price rebates or kickbacks shown as 
increased costs of goods sold are to be disallowed as illegal payments. See Max Sobel Wholesale 
Liquors v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Rev. Rul. 82-149, 1982-2 C.B. 56. 
65 Coed Records, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 422 (1967) (prior law). 
66 Atzinger-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 173 (1961). 
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such as asbestos, that have been put to commercial or industrial use. 
Moreover, the synthetic chemicals themselves are derivatives of 
natural materials, especially petroleum. Because mineral extraction 
and petroleum production are the root of most hazardous wastes, 
the percentage depletion allowance for investments in natural 
resources67 relates directly to waste reduction policy. 
The percentage depletion allowance alters the preference between 
extraction and use of virgin materials as compared to the recycling 
of used materials. Because the extraction, refining, and processing 
of virgin materials typically generates greater amounts of waste 
materials than recycling of used materials, the percentage depletion 
allowance again becomes relevant to waste management and reduc-
tion. 
The percentage depletion allowance emerges from an elaborate 
network of rules relating to the depletion of natural resources. De-
spite the complexities, the system reduces to two fundamental sys-
tems of depletion, namely cost depletion and percentage depletion. 
Cost depletion68 is designed to recover the taxpayer's interest in 
an exhaustible natural resource at the rate at which it is being 
extracted. There are virtually no distinctions among the types of 
resources being exploited. The depletion of timber is complicated, 
but only by the obvious fact that trees propagate and grow. Because 
of such growth, the taxpayer's depletable investment in each unit of 
standing timber tends to diminish with the passage of time. Aside 
from timber, however, the cost depletion system is essentially 
straightforward and has engendered little audit controversy or leg-
islative concern. 
By contrast, percentage depletion tends to be exasperatingly com-
plex because of Congress's obvious ambivalence toward the system. 69 
Percentage depletion simply means a deduction based on a percent-
age of the sale price. The sales may bar actual sales or constructive 
sales. Vertically integrated resource companies use constructive 
sales prices, as when a copper company mines the ore, processes it, 
and makes a final product like copper wire. 70 
For example, domestic oil and gas extracted and sold by a so-
called independent producer is depletable at a rate of fifteen per-
67 I.R.C. §§ 611-613A. 
68 Id. §§ 611-612. To illustrate cost depletion, if a taxpayer paid $10,000 for a mine containing 
100,000 tons of coal, the taxpayer could claim a ten cent deduction ($10,000 divided by 100,000) 
for each ton of coal extracted and sold. See id. 
69 Compare, e.g., id. §§ 611-613 with id. §§ 57(a)(l), 291(a)(2), 613A, 613(b). 
7°Id. §§ 613, 613A. 
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cent. 71 To illustrate, assume a small oil and gas producer pays $10,000 
for an estate that turns out to contain 10,000 barrels of oil. In the 
first year, the producer sells 1000 barrels at $10 per barrel. She can 
claim a deduction of $1500 (.15 x $10 x 1000). In the second year, 
she also sells 1000 barrels, but the price jumps to $20 per barrel. 
For the second year, the percentage depletion deduction rises to 
$3000. 
The key controversy about percentage depletion is that it is un-
related to the taxpayer's investment in her interest in the resource. 
If the taxpayer in the example had invested only $1.00 in the entire 
history of the natural resource property, she could still claim a $3,000 
deduction for the second year. By contrast, the cost depletion system 
would allow the oil and gas operator only a $1.00 depletion deduction 
over the life of the well for a $1.00 capital investment. Taxpayers 
must elect cost or percentage depletion on a property-by-property 
basis, depending on which procedure yields the greater tax deduction 
for the particular year. 72 
Congress has gradually pared back the percentage depletion sys-
tem over the years in ways that need not be addressed here in detail, 
especially with respect to the oil and gas industry. Nevertheless, 
the fundamental potential windfall of being able to claim a deduction 
for exhausting natural resources in excess of one's investment in the 
resource remains. 
From an environmental perspective, the deduction yields some 
truly perverse results because of the way the Code distributes the 
"windfall." In the case of hard-rock minerals in particular, different 
minerals qualify for deduction at dramatically different rates. The 
higher the rate, the better the taxpayer's vantage. 
The average percentage depletion rate is 12.1 percent. 73 The high-
est rate, twenty-two percent, is granted to asbestos, uranium, lead, 
and mercury! Each of these minerals is notorious for its capacity to 
damage the human body, the environment, or both. 74 Moreover, EPA 
has taken specific steps to reduce the use of these substances and 
limit human exposure. 75 No legislative history underlies this curious 
71Id. § 613A. 
72 Treas. Reg. § 1. 169-l{a)(1) (as amended in 1972). 
73 Based on averaging the seven different rates set forth in I.R.C. § 613(b)(l). 
74 Ford, Who Will Compensate the Victims of Asbestos Related Diseases? Manville's Chap-
ter 11 Fuels the Fire, 14 ENVTL. L. 465, 466-68 (1984); EPA Sets Standards for Radiation 
from Active Uranium Mills, TRIAL, Dec. 1983, at 13-14; Lead: Assessing Its Health Hazards, 
2 HEALTH & ENVTL. DIG. 1 (1988); N. HUDDLE & M. REICH, ISLAND OF DREAMS: ENVIRON-
MENTAL CRISIS IN JAPAN 102-32 (1975) (telling the story of mercury poisoning in Minamata). 
75 All the minerals except lead are designated as hazardous air pollutants under the Clean 
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favoritism for such harmful materials in our tax laws. One can fairly 
ask whether these substances should not be reduced to the lowest 
rate or denied the percentage depletion deduction altogether, as in 
the cases of integrated oil and gas producers and transferees of 
proven oil and gas properties. 76 
By disproportionately encouraging the extraction of minerals with 
known significant toxic characteristics, present tax laws clash with 
sound environmental policies. The preferential treatment of these 
minerals deserves review on the reasonable expectation that they 
would be mined less eagerly in favor of less destructive alternatives 
if their percentage depletion rates were reduced or eliminated. In 
addition, serious consideration should be given to determining how 
to balance appropriately the extraction of virgin resources as op-
posed to recycling used resources. The present structure of the Code 
does nothing to encourage recycling. 77 
2. Feedstock Taxes and Superfund 
This section gives a thumbnail sketch of the complex set of taxes 
on forty-nine chemical and petroleum products that provides the 
major revenue source of the Superfund to clean up old and abandoned 
hazardous waste sites. 78 Congress selected these petroleum and 
chemical substances as the original source materials, or feedstocks, 
for most processes and products that generate hazardous waste. The 
taxes, found in sections 4611,4661, and, after 1986,4671 of the Code, 
were designed to raise $1.38 billion for the fiscal period 1980-85. 
The amount was to be supplemented by $220 million from general 
revenues, for a total fund of $1.6 billion. 79 Actual revenues were only 
$863 million by the end of 1984 because of declining production of 
the taxed feedstocks. 80 Meanwhile, the estimates of costs to clean 
up hazardous waste sites continued to climb. By 1985, the General 
Air Act, meaning that EPA has concluded that they are expected to increase mortality, serious 
irreversible illness, or incapacitating reversible illness. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(I); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 61.01(a). Lead is regulated as an ambient air pollutant, again based on health effects. 
76 LR.C. § 613A(a), (c)(9) (1986). 
77 The Office of Technology Assessment is considering this issue. The results should be 
interesting. 
78 Superfund is a creation of Title II of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982) as amended by 
SARA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (Supp. IV 1986), codified in various sections of the Internal Revenue 
Code. The expenditure of the Superfund monies is limited to hazardous waste response under 
§ 111 of CERCLA. LR.C. § 9507(c) (1986). 
79 H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 317-18, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3410-11. 
80 Viard, Tax Issues Raised by SuperJurctiReauthorization, 28 TAX NOTES 1026,1026 (1985). 
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Accounting Office estimated total costs to be in the range of $39 
billion but possibly as high as $100 billion. 81 In response, Congress 
in 1986 increased the five-year revenue goal to $8.5 billion. 82 
The concept behind the feedstock taxes is to force the industries 
that presumably benefited in the past from the cheap and inadequate 
waste disposal practices that created the waste sites to shoulder the 
current cost of cleaning up those wastes. Unfortunately, the rela-
tionship between the particular tax and the environmental exter-
nalities from the particular material is acknowledged to be crude. 83 
Although the debate in the mid-1980s on reauthorization of Super-
fund included discussion about this relationship, Congress only con-
sidered, but ultimately did not adopt, a direct tax on the hazardous 
wastes themselves. 84 
c. Tax Treatment of Waste Treatment and Disposal 
In two specific instances, Congress has modified the Code to adapt 
to environmental concerns. One involves the rapid amortization of 
certain pollution control facilities. 85 The other involves tax-exempt 
81Id. 
82 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, SUPERFUND DESKBOOK 51 (1986). The shares of 
expected revenue from various sources break down as follows (in billions of dollars): 
Petroleum tax $2.759 
Feedstock chemicals tax $1.365 
Imported chemicals tax $0.057 
Environmental (general 
industry) tax $2.522 
General revenues $1.250 
Superfund originally taxed crude oil at 0.79 cents per barrel. CERCLA, 26 U.S.C. § 4611 
(1982). The 1986 amendments increased this tax to 8.2 cents per barrel for domestic crude, 
and 11. 7 cents for imported crude. I.R.C. § 4611(c). Twelve primary petrochemicals and thirty 
inorganic chemicals are taxed at rates varying between twenty-two cents per ton for potassium 
hydroxide and $10.13 per ton for xylene. Id. § 4661(b). 
83 Viard, supra note 80, at 1028. 
84 Id. at 1029. Whatever their benefits from an economic incentive viewpoint, waste-end 
taxes tend to be an uncertain source of revenue because taxpayers will seek ways to reduce 
the amount of hazardous waste they generate. This may be environmentally constructive, but 
the revenue deterioration is not appropriate for a major tax designed to raise billions of 
dollars. There is also substantial concern that some firms will evade a waste-end tax by 
surreptitious disposal of wastes-so-called midnight dumping. 
Congress heard proposals for other sources of revenue, including a much larger share for 
general revenues and a broad-based tax on industrial generators of hazardous waste. Although 
a broad-based tax on waste generators was not adopted, about one-quarter of the revenues 
for the five-year period 1986-90 will come from a new "environmental tax" related to corporate 
income taxes. See supra note 82. 
85 I.R.C. § 169. 
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financing of waste treatment facilities. 86 The former topic is fairly 
controversial. The latter has attracted little attention. 
1. Amortization of Pollution Control Facilities 
Section 169 of the Code allows certified pollution control facilities 
to be amortized over a period of sixty months, beginning with the 
month following acquisition or completion, or with the next taxable 
year. The provision is elective, and is designed to induce private 
industry to commit funds for anti-pollution facilities that "generally 
do not result in any increase in the profitability of a plant. "87 
In order to qualify for this rapid write-off, the facility has to be 
certified by federal and state authorities as conforming with pre-
scribed standards for the prevention, abatement, or control of air or 
water pollution.88 The facility must not significantly change the out-
put capacity or useful life of the taxpayer's plant, nor may it reduce 
the plant's operating costS. 89 The facility's costs must also not be 
repaid by the recovery of wastes,90 and, if the facility has a useful 
life of over fifteen years, the portion of the investment that can be 
written off under section 169 is reduced proportionately. 91 
For example, if the facility's useful life were thirty years, one-half 
of its cost could be written off in five years (sixty months) and the 
rest could be written off over the normal useful life. The election to 
amortize the improvement over a sixty-month period is terminable 
at will. 92 Section 169 does not apply if the facility might otherwise 
have been installed, even though it is certified as useful for combat-
ting pollution and does not add significant value to the plant. 93 
What Congress gave in section 169 it has partly taken back in 
various ways. Specifically, section 291(a)(5) provides that, in the case 
of a corporation, the amortizable basis of pollution control facilities 
under section 169 must be reduced by twenty percent, say from $1 
86 I.R.C. §§ 103, 142(a)(5), (6), (10). 
87 S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 580. See McDaniel 
& Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air and Water Pollution: 
A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 351 (1971); Reese, The 
Tax Implications of Pollution Control Investments After ERTA and TEFRA, 31 OIL & GAS 
TAX Q. 338, 376 (1982). 
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.169-2(a) (as amended in 1970). 
89 I.R.C. § 169(d)(I)(c) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.169-2(b)(2)(ii), 2(d). 
90 I.R.C. § 169(e) (1986). That is, if the facility recovers a useful material (for example, 
silver from photographic coating wastes), the value of the recovered material cannot equal or 
exceed the annualized cost of the facility itself. 
91 I d. § 169(0(2). 
92Id. § 169(c). 
93 See Treas. Reg. § 1.169-2(d). 
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million to $800,000. Section 291(c)(1) in turn, however, subjects that 
twenty percent to depreciation under section 168. This juxtaposition 
evidences a surprising ambivalence on the part of Congress, and 
adds a nuisance to already elaborate bookkeeping requirements. In 
general, Congress designed section 291 to limit certain exceptional 
tax benefit claims by corporations. This populist limitation merely 
invites taxpayers to change the form in which business is conducted, 
which is clearly an undesirable outcome. 94 
In addition, the alternative minimum tax95 applies to the acceler-
ated amortization of such pollution control facilities. The base on 
which the tax falls, if at all, is the amount actually claimed under 
section 169 minus the significantly smaller amount that the taxpayer 
would have been entitled to had he or she written off the asset under 
section 168(g).96 That tax applies at a twenty-one percent rate for 
individuals and twenty percent for corporations. 97 
On one hand, section 169 provides a healthy incentive to install 
facilities that will not have commercial value because five-year amor-
tization is rapid compared to the usual seven to twenty-seven and a 
half year depreciation system that would otherwise apply.98 On the 
other hand, a well-sheltered taxpayer might find the possibility of 
an alternative minimum tax an undue burden. In addition, it is not 
clear that section 169 is available if one party leases it to another. 99 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or Congress should clarify this 
last question. 
Section 169 is subject to criticism on several grounds: it merely 
softens the blow of doing what regulators require anyway, but does 
not help taxpayers running tax losses; it only reaches some pollution; 
and, it fails to encourage use of less polluting fuels. The most serious 
criticism of section 169 is its denial in cases where it can add value 
or profit. 1OO Congress premised that denial on the existence of the 
now repealed investment tax credit (ITC), which made section 169 
inferior to the combination of cost recovery under section 168 plus 
the former ITC.101 
94 For example, using a partnership consisting of individuals acting as lessors to avoid 
I.R.C. § 291(c). 
95 I.R.C. § 55 (1986). 
96 Id. § 56(a)(5). 
97 Id. § 55(b)(1). 
98 See id. § 168(e). 
99 Reese, supra note 87, at 376-77. 
100 Millett, PoUution and The Federal Revenue Code, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 549 
(1972). 
101 See generally Reese, supra note 87; Moore & Streuling, Pollution Control Devices: 
Rapid Amortization Versus the Investment Credit, 52 TAXES 25 (1974). 
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Since passage of the 1986 Code, pollution control facilities have 
generally been favored under section 169 because recovery periods102 
are substantially longer for virtually all classes of tangible prop-
erty,103 making sixty-month amortization all the more appealing. For 
example, much public utility property such as coal-fired power 
plants, moved from being fifteen-year property104 to being twenty-
year property. 105 Also, Congress eliminated the lTC, thereby reduc-
ing the prior ten percent subsidy for acquiring industrial hardware, 
and further widening the disparity between pollution control equip-
ment and other hardware. 106 
An increasingly important restraint on section 169 arises from 
Congress's decision to apply it only to plants that were in operation 
before January 1, 1976. Because of this cutoff, the growing popula-
tion of new plants that have come onstream after 1975 gains no 
benefit from section 169. As a result, section 169 fails to create an 
incentive to build new plants that cost more but provide better 
control of toxic wastes for that increased cost. 107 
Commentators have criticized the provision for its oversimplified 
view of the competitive advantages involved. !Os Pollution control 
agencies already account for the extra expense of retrofitting equip-
ment in old plants, relative to comparable equipment in new plants, 
when they set pollution control standards, allow construction per-
mits, and determine who will have enforcement actions brought 
against them. 109 Even if an old plant must spend more money to 
102 See I.R.C. § 167 (1986). 
103 See id. § 168. 
104 Id. § 168(c)(2)(E) (replaced in 1986). 
105Id. § 168(e)(I); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1l, class 49.14 (1980). 
106 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
107 The January 1, 1976 cutoff was based on the Senate's view that the cost of upgrading 
old facilities is greater than the cost of redesigning new ones. See Reese, supra note 87, at 
362-74; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 249 (1969). 
108 See, e.g., Givelber & Schaffer, Section 169 of the Internal Revenue Code: An Income 
Tax Subsidy for the Control of Pollution, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 65 (1972). 
109 The Clean Water Act, for example, clearly states different technology criteria and cost-
consideration criteria for existing sources compared to new sources. Compare 33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1311(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (1983 & West Supp. 1988) with 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316. For a general 
discussion of technology and cost considerations in setting discharge limits under the Clean 
Water Act, see W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.29 (1986). The 
adage that old plants spend more money complying with such pollution laws than new plants 
is true, however, only when comparing plants within the same industry. Section 169 cannot 
differentiate between industries with high pollution control costs and competing industries 
that may be able to comply more cheaply. For example, it would favor an old steel mill over 
a new, less polluting, plastics plant even though both make parts for automobiles. 
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control pollution than would a new plant, the government should 
reduce the subsidy to the new plant proportionately instead of re-
fusing to subsidize it at all. To the extent these subsidies are intended 
to alleviate the hardships that accrue to investors in old plants when 
the legislature enacts tougher pollution control laws, such hardships 
fall on more recent plants as well as much older ones. In addition, 
section 169 has the inherent problem of propelling firms in the di-
rection of using end-of-pipe methods to control pollution from less 
efficient facilities rather than making process changes to reduce raw 
waste generation. The firm that changes fuels or modifies processes 
of production to minimize pollution receives no special subsidy even 
though such changes may be more efficient at reducing pollution 
than buying new waste treatment equipment. 
In addition to providing no incentive to build new plants with 
better waste controls, section 169 is arguably overbroad in that the 
EPA interprets it to include equipment permissively installed as 
well as equipment required to meet legal standards. 110 While the 
EPA view seems sound, it may be subject to abuse by the states. 
Section 169(d)(2)(A) defines a certified pollution control facility as a 
facility that a state certifying authority declares to be installed or 
acquired consistent with that state's program for pollution control.lll 
It does not require states to have mandated the investment through 
regulation or enforcement. Consequently, section 169(d)(2)(A) in-
vites states to encourage industrial relocation by having broad, per-
missive programs that allow maximum exploitation of section 169's 
benefits. 
Congress should explicitly amend the Code to conform to the EPA 
view in order to encourage voluntary control of pollution beyond 
legal minimums. The tax regulations will prevent taxpayer abuse of 
the system, so the only danger to a broad allowance for permissively 
installed pollution control may be a slight loss of revenue. Although 
section 169 is not pegged to the extent of reduction of pollution, but 
to capital invested,112 the backstop of action consistent with govern-
ment programs should be enough. 
Another objection to section 169 asserts that it is technically re-
gressive in that it gives a greater stimulus to taxpayers in higher 
110 Compare Pollution Control Facilities: Guidelines for Certification, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,132 
(1971) with H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1969). 
III I.R.C. § 169(d)(2)(A). 
112 I d. § 169(a). 
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tax brackets, and fails altogether to stimulate non-taxpaying oper-
ators such as municipalities or companies with operating loss car-
ryovers.113 Although these entities may desperately need financial 
subsidies, the section gives them no help. Congress should consider 
supplementing section 169 with a refundable credit or a direct sub-
sidy for financially needy owners and operators. 114 
Section 169 fails to get to the heart of the matter of reducing toxic 
wastes. It encourages end-of-pipe equipment over process changes 
and new materials, and it gives no help to the firms that need it 
most: those running tax losses. It also creates no incentive for post-
1975 plants to operate more cleanly. Even if some states could use 
section 169 to promote permissive investment in extra pollution 
control with a federal subsidy, for most companies, section 169 
merely subsidizes legally mandated pollution control investments. 
Overall, section 169 typifies the haphazard federal approach toward 
coordinating tax and environmental policies and highlights the need 
for much more thoughtful and systematic integration of taxation with 
environmental quality goals. 
2. Tax-exempt Financing 
Private activity bonds, such as corporate bonds, produce taxable 
interest. 115 Bonds issued to finance pollution control facilities in the 
hands of private owners are, therefore, prima facie incapable of 
producing tax-exempt interest. Section 141(d), however, exempts 
such bonds if they are "qualified bonds. "116 Qualified bonds, in turn, 
include "exempt facility bonds."117 Exempt facility bonds include 
those for sewage and solid waste disposal facilities and hazardous 
waste disposal facilities. 118 Except for the three types of facilities 
just mentioned, an exempt facility must serve regularly for general 
public use. 119 
113 See l.R.C. § 172 (1986). 
114 See generally Reed, Economic Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Applying Theory to 
Practice, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 511 (1970) (preference for effluent charge system). 
115 l.R.C. § 103(b) (1986). 
116Id. § 141(d). 
117Id. § 141(d)(I)(A). 
118Id. § 142(a)(5), (6), (10). It should be noted that the 1986 Tax Reform Act substantially 
rewrote the Code's provisions on tax exempt bonds. The provisions of interest to us here, 
however, were modified only slightly, so regulations and precedents established under the 
pre-1986 Code remain valid. 
119 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(2) (as amended in 1983). 
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The Treasury regulations carefully and elaborately define facilities 
that qualify for the exempt facility exemption. 120 The regulations 
define sewage disposal facilities and solid waste disposal facilities as 
property used for the collection, storage, treatment, utilization, pro-
cessing, or final disposal of sewage or solid waste. l2l Pursuant to 
these regulations, a facility that recycles solid wastes can qualify as 
a solid waste disposal facility if solid waste accounts for at least 
sixty-five percent of the waste handled. 122 Even if this type of facility 
"operates at a profit," it can still qualify if the solid waste it treats 
or disposes is useless or unwanted material that has no market value 
and that no one is willing to purchase. 123 
In addition to sewage and solid waste facilities, the regulations 
define air and water pollution control facilities as serving the public 
good and thus fulfilling the public use requisite. 124 A property is 
considered an air or water pollution control facility if it is used wholly 
or partly to abate pollution by removing, altering, disposing, or 
storing the contaminant, tind if the expenditure would not have been 
made except for the purpose of pollution control. 125 To allow for 
depreciation, the expenditure must also satisfy the requirements of 
section 167, namely, that the property have a limited physical life 
and be held for use in a trade or business or for the production of 
income. 126 In addition, a federal, state, or local agency must certify 
that the facility controls air or water pollution or that it meets 
federal, state, and local standards to control air and water pollu-
tion. 127 
It does not matter if the facility also engages in reprocessing the 
waste, generation of energy, or other activities ancillary to waste 
120 I d. § 1.103-8(f), (g). 
121 Id. § 1.103-8(f)(2)(i), (ii). 
122 Id. § 1.103-8(f)(2)(ii)(c). 
123Id. § 1.103-8(f)(2)(ii)(b). Since this regulation was written, the definition of solid waste 
has been amended and recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982). The amended definition of 
solid waste is somewhat broader than the original definition. 
124 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(g)(I) (as amended in 1983). 
125Id. § 1.103-8(g)(2)(i)(b), (ii), (iii). 
126Id. § 1.103-8(g)(2)(i)(a) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 167(a) (1982». 
127Id. § 1.103-8(g)(2)(i)(a), (b). Expenditures for property are sufficient to fulfill the require-
ments of subdivisions (iii) and (iv) as long as the property will be used for the control of 
pollution, even if it serves functions other than just the control of pollution. If, however, a 
significant purpose other than the control of pollution will be served, only the expenditures 
spent for pollution control will satisfy the test of this subdivision. A significant purpose is 
defined as one that produces "an increase in production or capacity, or in the material extension 
of the useful life of a manufacturing or production facility or part thereof." Id. § 1.103-
8(g)(2)(v). 
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disposal. Under the temporary Treasury rules, however, the portion 
of the cost of the solid waste disposal facility that is actually used in 
the disposal process is allocable to solid waste disposal for section 
141(d) purposes. 128 
The foregoing regulations contain no surprises. They basically 
allow a subsidy by removing a tax on income from capital for estab-
lishing two forms of waste removal facilities. This innocuous provi-
sion does not seem to merit much debate. Its effectiveness, however, 
is questionable. Many waste removal facilities will probably be built 
anyway, and the subsidy may not be sufficient to stimulate increased 
construction of such facilities where they are needed. It should be 
noted that the types of wastes contemplated by section 141(d) are 
much more extensive than the toxic wastes that are the focus of this 
Article, and include such items as household waste and discarded 
newspapers. 
D. Tax Treatment of Post-disposal Liabilities 
The federal income tax implications of liabilities that arise after 
disposal of toxic wastes have assumed major significance for both 
revenue and environmental policies. Parties responsible for existing 
waste site cleanup under Superfund face multi-billion dollar liabili-
ties, prompting increased attention of state governments, banks, 
insurance companies, and real estate developers, as well as industrial 
concerns, to the financial arrangements for potential waste-related 
liabilities. Although the tax implications of such liabilities raise per-
haps the most important policy questions in this Article, analysis of 
these questions must inevitably focus on specific tax accounting ques-
tions. 
This section begins with a survey of tax accounting concepts, and 
then moves to the implication of denying taxpayers deductions for 
setting aside money to take care of liabilities they will face in the 
future. As will be seen, the one bright spot for tax policy is the 
special treatment of nuclear decommissioning costs. The final ele-
ments of this section concern the tax incentives for forming under-
capitalized subsidiaries to carryon environmentally risky activities 
and the possibility of using casualty insurance as an alternative to 
reserves for future liabilities. 
128 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 17.l(a) (1975). 
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1. Background on Accrual Method Deductions and Reserves for 
Future Expenses 
775 
The cost of cleanup and compensation for injuries attributed to 
hazardous waste has generated more discussion and controversy in 
the last ten years than the regulation of the wastes themselves. 129 
In RCRA,130 Congress foresaw the problem of contingent future 
liabilities for current waste disposal practices, and enacted a require-
ment for bonding or insurance for liabilities and clean-up costs oc-
curring after the closure of a waste disposal site.l31 By 1980, Con-
gress had become aware of problems throughout the country with 
old, often abandoned, hazardous waste sites, and passed the Super-
fund law to marshal national resources to clean them up. 132 
Superfund has had its most profound impact on the actions of 
parties who are potentially responsible for clean-up costs at partic-
ular sites. 133 The potentially responsible parties, especially the in-
dustrial generators of toxic wastes, now seek strategies and legal 
arrangements that will reduce, absolve, or shift their liability. In 
many cases, however, such avoidance strategies are impossible or 
impractical. The potentially responsible parties therefore also seek 
ways to accumulate capital sufficient to cover hazardous waste lia-
bilities that they cannot avoid. 
The fundamental issue that arises with respect to post-disposal 
liability is whether and to what extent a taxpayer should be allowed 
to claim a tax deduction for expenditures that will be paid out in 
some future year. 134 The issue of deductibility of future expenses 
relates primarily to taxpayers on the accrual method, the system 
used by most major business taxpayers and manufacturers. 135 
129 Futrell, Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances: Lessons from Superfund, RCRA, and 
other Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REV. 125 (1987); see also Lucero, Responses to J. 
William Futrell, 24 Hous. L. REV. 143, 148 (1987); Special Issue: Managing Liability from 
Hazardous Waste, 25 Hous. L. REV. 715-977 (1988). 
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
131 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6), (t)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), implemented by rules at 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 264.140-264.151 (1987). 
132 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9659 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
133 The law enumerates four classes of people legally liable for cleanup: current owners and 
operators of the site; owners and operators at the time of waste disposal; generators of the 
wastes at the site; and those who transported the wastes to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
Collectively, they are commonly known as the "potentially responsible parties." 
134 The following materials deal with an arcane topic of tax accounting. Every attempt is 
made to simplify the concepts, many of which may appear baffling to the uninitiated reader. 
135 I.R.C. § 446(c)(2) (1982). 
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Under the accrual method, a taxpayer reports income when all 
the events fixing the right to payment have taken place (for example, 
when an order of goods is shipped out) regardless of when actual 
payment is due or received. 136 Likewise, a deduction is available 
when all the events fixing the duty to make a payment in some 
future year have taken place. 137 For example, if removing the ov-
erburden above a mineral deposit to be stripmined triggers a duty 
to pay money in order to rehabilitate the land, a deduction may be 
available when the overburden has been removed even though the 
area may not be reclaimed until well in the future. 138 
Under the cash method of accounting, by contrast, taxpayers do 
not report income until it is actually received, and they cannot claim 
deductions until they are actually paid. To the extent that the pay-
ments produce values that last into future years, however, they must 
be proportionately "capitalized" (suspended) and written off in such 
future years. 139 
The preceding summary of the accrual and cash methods describes 
financial accounting140 more accurately than it does tax accounting. 
Over the years, tax accounting has generally drifted away from the 
fairly pure world of financial accounting, usually in favor of the IRS 
and against the accrual method taxpayer. In other words, the ten-
dency has been to put accrual method taxpayers onto the cash 
method if doing so raises taxes. 
The government has used three major tools to shift the balance in 
its favor. First, section 446(b) of the Code authorizes the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue to impose his or her own method of 
accounting on the taxpayer if the taxpayer's method is found to 
distort income or to fail to reflect income accurately.141 The Com-
missioner has used this weapon with great success to force prepaid 
receipts to be taxed on receipt, thereby effectively putting accrual 
method taxpayers on the cash method. 142 Second, the government 
has applied the so-called claim-of-right doctrine to tax accrual 
method taxpayers on income they have earned and exercise dominion 
136 Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1934). 
137 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l{c)(ii) (1988). 
138 Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 1369 (1981). 
139 See 1. R. C. § 263 (1986). 
140 The term refers to accounting practice applied by CP As reporting the annual financial 
results of enterprises, for the benefit of creditors and owners of the enterprise. 
141 Such actions by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot be reversed unless they 
constitute an abuse of discretion, which is a difficult standard for taxpayers to meet. See Lucas 
v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930), rev'g 30 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1929). 
142 See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS § 105.1.6 (1981). 
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over, even though the earnings are forfeitable and hence not formally 
accruable. 143 Third, the economic performance requirement embod-
ied in section 461(h) of the Code144 denies deductions for future 
disbursements until the taxpayer receives services, property, or use 
of property for which the taxpayer has contracted. This triad of 
forces has made tax commentators cynical about Congress's willing-
ness to distort coherent accounting principles in order to accelerate 
the flow of revenue145 and makes accrual method taxpayers under-
standably feisty about further incursions on their tax accounting 
territory. 
The tax treatment of general reserve accounting shows how Con-
gress has disrupted traditional accounting practices. General reserve 
accounting is a method that accrual method taxpayers have tradi-
tionally used to establish reserves to cover future expenses. The 
method is best described by example:146 
Mr. Scheussler sells home furnaces. The price of a furnace is 
$550. In connection with selling a furnace, Mr. Scheussler prom-
ises to turn off the furnace in the spring and to clean and start 
it each fall for five years. He estimates the cost of doing so at 
$10 per year, that is, $50 over the five-year period. Accordingly, 
in the year of the sale, he reports $550 of gross income on the 
sale of each furnace, but offsets that figure by $50, his "reserve" 
for future expenditures in connection with each furnace. Each 
year in which he actually services the furnace, he will add $10 
to income, but will subtract the actual cost of servicing the 
furnace ($10.50 in the first year, $7.50 in the second year, etc.). 
As the example shows, the reserve method reflects his income 
accurately in that it appropriately reduces what would otherwise be 
inflated income ($550) in the first year by the anticipated future costs 
of the contract. Accountants endorse the reserve method because of 
its levelling effect, which creates a steadier pattern of income (or 
loss) and better matches the timing of income and deductions. For 
example, if Mr. Scheussler simply reported $550 in year one and a 
$10 loss in years two through six, the outcome would be silly because 
the transactional event is the sale of a furnace at a net gain of $500 
(less its cost to him), not a large profit in one year and a series of 
losses in succeeding years. 
143 See North Am. Oil Conso!. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 424 (1932). 
144 Effective in 1985 and later years. 
145 See, e.g., Malman, Treatment of Prepaid Income-Clear Reflection of Income or Muddied 
Waters, 37 TAX L. REV. 103 (1981); Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tax Treatment 
of Future Costs, 40 TAX L. REV. 577 (1985). 
146 See Schuessler v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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Although general reserve accounting is accurate, taxpayers can 
manipulate the method by shrewdly creating liabilities that will not 
call for payment until far in the future. 147 The introduction of section 
461(h) in 1984 therefore eliminated the general use of reserves for 
future expenses. As a result, the only way for an accrual method 
taxpayer to deduct liabilities (whether or not denominated reserves) 
for future expenditures is to undertake the activity that produces 
the liability (in our example, clean and fire up the furnace) or take 
advantage of some specijic reserve accounting provision that ex-
pressly allows such a deduction despite the general restriction im-
posed by section 461(h).148 
2. Environmental Policy Implications of Lack of General Reserve 
Accounting and the Economic Performance Limitation 
The unavailability of general reserve accounting produces conflict-
ing considerations for the taxpayer. To illustrate the issues, a hy-
pothetical taxpayer may be useful. Assume that the taxpayer is an 
incorporated junkyard that uses the accrual method. The company 
is aware that its activities, such as piling up old batteries and allow-
ing associated toxins to accumulate, will almost surely result in 
eventual contamination of the local groundwater, with consequent 
state intervention, possible fines, and a need to clean up the toxic 
wastes it has collected. 
Case 1: 
Taxpayers who are on the accrual method in theory qualify for a 
deduction if they can show that their actions either have resulted in 
a fixed liability to correct their malfeasance or have rendered the 
payment schedule so clear that a current deduction is permissible. 149 
The pure accrual method thus encourages the junkyard to solidify 
its liability so that it can report the deduction immediately. Such an 
incentive could induce the junkyard operator to engage in destruc-
147 See, e.g., Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(current deductibility of "bonds" due 20 years in the future successfully challenged under 
§ 446(b) power). 
148 Later in the Article, we discuss several such specific Code provisions that have special 
significance from an enviromnental perspective. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying 
text. 
149 This is the result under traditional, or financial, accrual accounting, shorn of the economic 
performance requirement of I.R.C. § 461(h). 
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tive behavior, reasoning that "it's deductible" although not payable 
until well into the future. 150 
Solidifying the deduction, however, may be taken as an admission 
of guilt, assuming the taxpayer's income tax records are accessible. 
For publicly traded companies, the solidified deductions may need 
to be reported in securities filings.151 On one hand, the liability to 
correct the behavior may be largely avoided if it is so far in the 
future as to be trivialized by discounting it to its present value. 152 
On the other hand, if the taxpayer is a corporation, liquidating the 
corporation will generally trigger a tax liability that will reverse the 
prior deduction. 153 
Claiming the deduction does not assure that the taxpayer will fund 
the liability by setting aside money to make the indicated future 
payment. Should the issue be the subject of an IRS audit, it is 
conceivable that the taxpayer and the IRS could enter into a so-
called closing agreemenV54 under which the deduction would be al-
lowed if cash payments were made that corresponded to the deduc-
tion. That speculation would not affect pre-audit behavior. 
Case 2: 
As a result of section 461(h) of the Code, accrual method taxpayers 
cannot deduct the liabilities for correcting their malfeasance until 
the correction is made. The implication for our junkyard is that, 
unless and until the cleanup is undertaken, it cannot report a de-
duction. Thus, the company has no incentive to save for clean-up 
expenses or to pay insurance premiums to generate a cash reserve. 
Once cleanup becomes physically feasible, an incentive arises to clean 
up because doing so will produce a current tax deduction. If the 
property is so far gone that the correction would be deemed a 
150 In a high interest rate environment, however, the discounted future cost of remedying 
the malfeasance could be lower than the tax benefit of the current legislation. If the taxpayer 
were a corporation paying the general top rate of 34% of taxable income, the value of the 
deduction would be 34% of the reported amount. For example, a $1,000 accrued deduction 
reduces current year taxes by $340. The further into the future the actual disbursement is 
pushed, the lower its real present cost. The higher the interest rate applied to discount a 
future disbursement, the lower its present value cost will be. 
151 See generally Resource Materials: Fraud, Inside Information, and Fiduciary Duty 
under Rule lOb-5, A.L.1. (1976). 
152 See supra note 150. 
153 See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner (United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.), 460 U.S. 
370 (1983). This would not be true if it were liquidated into a parent corporation under 1. R. C. 
§ 332 (1986). 
154 See 1. R. C. § 7121 (1986). 
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rehabilitation, however, that expense would have to be capitalized. 155 
The Code enhances the incentive because the taxpayer may be able 
to borrow money, with associated interest expense deductions, to 
perform the job. 156 
Case 3: 
The facts are the same as Case 2, but the taxpayer is on the cash 
method. The same results occur as in Case 2 above because the Code 
allows no deduction until the year of payment, or later if and to the 
extent performance occurs in a later year. 157 For example, assume a 
corporate taxpayer on the cash method contracted with an outside 
company to clean up its toxic wastes at a price of $1 million. The 
contract called for paying the $1 million in 1990, but for doing half 
the cleanup in 1990, and half in 1991. The corporation may deduct 
only $500,000 in 1990; the balance may not be deducted until 1991. 
Case .4: 
Suppose the taxpayer is subjected to fines or penalties for its 
violations. The result is no deduction. 158 Denial of a tax benefit is 
appropriate because allowing a deduction would weaken the sting of 
the fines or penalties. 
Under present tax law, environmentally destructive behavior that 
creates a clean-up duty has little tax significance. Regardless of a 
taxpayer's method of accounting, the Code allows no tax deduction 
until the year the cleanup occurs. In general, this result is reason-
able, because it offers no tax incentive for destructive behavior, and 
it creates a tax benefit for engaging in an actual cleanup. It does 
nothing, however, to stimulate the taxpayer to set aside funds to 
cover the eventual liabilities its actions will generate. 
155 The deduction would be available under § 162(a). Section 263 might force capitalization 
if the correction made the property suitable for a new use vis-a-vis its status when acquired 
by the taxpayer. Compare Midland Empire Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 Tax Ct. Rep. 
(CCH) 635 (1950) with Mt. Morris Drive-In Theater Co. v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 85 (6th 
Cir. 1956). 
156 1. R. C. § 163 (1986). 
157 [d. § 263. 
158 [d. § 162(0. 
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3. The Special Case of Nuclear Decommissioning Costs 
One of the rare exceptions to the general rule against deductions 
for adding to reserves for future expenses appears in section 468A.159 
This provision permits taxpayers to deduct actual payments made 
to reserve funds to pay for future costs of decommissioning nuclear 
power plants. Section 468A(b) limits such payments to the lesser of 
decommissioning deductions claimed for ratemaking purposes or a 
"ruling amount" individually approved by the IRS as an accurate 
reflection of future expenses. 160 The earnings of each nuclear decom-
missioning fund are taxable at top corporate rates as if the fund 
were a domestic business corporation. 161 The fund is carefully cir-
cumscribed so as to be usable for no other purpose and to assure 
that it terminates when its purpose is achieved. 162 
From a tax accounting perspective, section 468A is an enlightened 
provision because it matches income and expenditures over time, 
while limiting the deduction to actual payments into the fund. More-
over, it seems compatible with environmental goals because it en-
courages adequate funding for the potentially enormous costs of 
shutting down obsolescent nuclear power plants, a result that is 
preferable to the risk that the public might have to bear the eventual 
cost. If it has any weakness, it may be that section 468A needs to 
be tightened somewhat to make the fund immune from invasion by 
the taxpayer or its creditors. Its enlightened tax treatment for 
accumulating capitol for cleanup makes section 468A a good model 
for funding liabilities for future disbursements to rectify unavoidable 
environmental damage from accepted, legitimate business activities 
generating and disposing hazardous wastes. 
4. The Special Case of Solid Waste Reclamation Costs 
Section 468 is a complex section relating to mine closing and solid 
waste reclamation. The provision relating to mines parallels that for 
solid waste reclamation. The core concept of these section 468 pro-
visions is to grant taxpayers a current deduction for the costs of 
reclaiming waste sites and closing mines. 163 The amount of the de-
duction is calculated by a sinking fund approach, the effect of which 
159Id. § 468A; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.468A-O to -8 (1988). 
160 See I.R.C. § 468A(d)(2) (1986) for the definition of the term "ruling amount." 
161 Id. § 468A(e). 
162Id. 
163 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 875 (1984) (referring to new I.R.C. 
§ 468). 
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is to grant relatively smaller tax deductions in the early years to 
accommodate growth of the reserve funds that resulted from the 
taxpayer's contributions to the fund over the years. 164 
No actual payment into the reserve is needed in order to claim 
the deduction. The deduction is permissible, however, only if the 
reclamation involves a property reclaimed under a permit issued 
pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act as amended by RCRA,165 
or similar federal, state, or local laws. The Code excludes any waste 
site that a taxpayer disturbs after it is listed on the National Prior-
ities List (NPL) under section 105 of CERCLA.166 This exclusion 
has the effect of barring a current deduction for response or reme-
diation costs required under the Superfund program for NPL sites, 
and thus might encourage private site cleanup to preempt listing of 
the site on the NPL. 
Mine closing activities must be conducted in accordance with a 
reclamation plan submitted pursuant to sections 511 or 528 of the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977167 and made 
part of a surfacing mining and reclamation permit granted under 
Title V of that Act. Alternatively, the closing may be conducted 
pursuant to a plan submitted under a substantially similar state or 
federal law containing permit requirements. 168 The Code delegates 
the power to control the nature of the reclamation or closing activity 
to those closest to the scene, but local control can result in a lack of 
uniformity among the states. 
In the worst case, a well-intentioned mining operation that accu-
mulated cash reserves for eventual closing costs would get no current 
deduction because it failed to qualify under a rigorous regimen. In 
contrast, a taxpayer that did not intend to comply with actual closing 
requirements would get a current deduction for an act it never 
performed because it formally complied with a relaxed state stan-
dard. Eventual nonperformance would be punished by reporting the 
reserve as gross income in the year of nonperformance, but the tax 
cost of doing so might be minor because the burden arises so far in 
the future. A requirement that the reserve be funded and escrowed 
164 For a general explanation of the sinking-fund concept, see M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION, A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS ~ 6.08 
(1988). 
165 Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (latest codification 
after 1984 amendments). See also I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(B) (1986). 
166 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1986); I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1986). 
167 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (1986). 
168 I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
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would solve this problem by matching cost contributions to the es-
crow account with the permissible deductions. 
The mine closing and solid waste reclamation deduction is a so-
phisticated form of reserve accounting, but it fails to require actual 
contributions to fund the reserve. As such, it suffers a serious weak-
ness, given the possibility that the taxpayer may be defunct by the 
time the duty to pay actually arises. It is good tax accounting but 
arguably offends public policy. 
5. Corporate Tax Provisions Relating to Undercapitalized 
Subsidiaries 
A major practical problem involved in abstractions about allocating 
the burden of liabilities associated with toxic wastes is the waste 
producer's ability to pay. State corporate laws are notorious for 
allowing minimal capitalization of corporations. The only firm cor-
porate law limitations involve prohibitions on paying dividends that 
would render the payor corporation insolvent. 169 
Rational business corporations engaged in environmentally risky 
activities will, all things being equal, isolate those activities in sep-
arate subsidiary corporations. As a matter of general law, courts 
will not impute to the parent the corporate liability of a subsidiary. 
Nevertheless, a subsidiary is considered an asset of the parent that 
can be reached by a judgment creditor of that parent corporation. 
Locating risky activity in the parent makes the subsidiary an asset 
that can be reached by judgment creditors. Rational businesses will 
avoid such a structure, and locate the activity in a subsidiary. 
The Code does nothing to discourage formation and reshuffling of 
subsidiaries to minimize environmental liabilities. Section 351 per-
mits tax-deferred contributions of appreciated property to controlled 
corporations. 17o These contributions may include property whose 
value has declined and been depreciated to an amount lower than its 
value. The Treasury maintains, on doubtful authority, that a tax-
free incorporation of such an asset requires a business purpose:17l 
this requirement hardly presents an obstacle, however, because 
"business purposes" include isolation of hazardous activities in sep-
arate corporations. 172 
169 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 890-95 (1983). 
170 See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS 
AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 3 (5th ed. 1987). 
171 Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. 
172 B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS ~ 13.09 (1979). 
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The Code also facilitates shearing away subsidiaries or breaking 
up separate lines of business into separate corporations for distri-
bution to shareholders. 173 On general tax principles, such transac-
tions are taxable as distributions or as gain (or loss) producing 
dispositions of stoCk. 174 Section 355, however, permits nontaxable 
corporate division if it is not a "device" to distribute earnings of 
either corporation, the resulting corporations are engaged in active 
businesses that were conducted for five years before the distribution, 
and control of the spun-off company comes to rest in the hands of 
shareholders. 175 
The interpretation given to the "device" provision176 is especially 
troublesome for toxic waste policy. Insulating the parent company 
from potential liabilities has been explicitly approved as a valid 
business purpose, not a mere "device,"I77 that justifies spinning off 
or otherwise separating the corporate operations. 178 
The tax laws facilitate shell games using corporate subsidiaries to 
minimize liabilities arising in connection with hazardous wastes. 
Given the great difficulties of working out proper regulatory models 
for dealing with toxic waste management, the Code should not com-
plicate environmental policy by facilitating tax-free reshuffling of 
business enterprises in order to evade their potential liabilities. A 
reasonable reform would be to limit tax-free incorporation to those 
restructurings that do not entail escape from environmental liabili-
ties, and to restrict section 355 in a similar manner. Such tax reforms 
would not be necessary, it should be noted, if the state corporate 
law liability system were broad enough to make the "shell game" 
defense ineffective. 
6. Tax Treatment of Liability Insurance 
The tax treatment of purchased liability insurance is well settled. 
As long as the coverage has a business purpose, it is deductible (if 
at all) under section 162 to the extent that it covers liabilities in the 
current year. 179 With similar effect, section 461(b) prevents deduc-
tion in the case of an accrual method taxpayer until the year for 
173 I.R.C. § 355 (1986). 
174Id. §§ 301, 1001. 
175 The provisions of § 355 are rather intricate; the statement in the text is highly simplified. 
176 See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 172, ~ 13.06. 
177 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-187, 1976-1 C.B. 97; Rev. Rul. 76-527, 1976-2 C.B. 103. 
178 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-197, 1959-2 C.B. 77. 
179 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942). See also 
I.R.C. § 461(g) (1986) (cash method taxpayer). 
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which the coverage was purchased. 180 By contrast, a deduction for 
self-insurance is impermissible on the theory that no risk transfer 
took place. 181 
Captive insurance stands in the middle ground between commer-
cial insurance and self-insurance. The tax law surrounding captive 
insurance companies is quite well developed, but the concepts are 
somewhat complex. For purposes of the overview in this Article, 
however, a few general statements can safely be made. 
To have insurance for tax purposes-and hence a potential busi-
ness expense deduction for the cost of insurance premiums-both 
risk transfer and risk distribution must occur. 182 Thus, if an insurance 
company is wholly owned by another company, and the insurer 
insures only the parent's risk, no tax deduction can be taken for the 
premiums paid by the parent.l83 Moreover, a business may not de-
duct alleged premiums that it disguises as reserves, which would 
otherwise be nondeductible. l84 Insurance premiums against fire, 
storm, theft, accident, or other similar losses in the case of a business 
are deductible,l85 but identical payments set aside in a reserve fund 
established by a taxpayer are nondeductible on the theory that all 
the events that fix the fact of the liability have not taken place. 186 
The tax implications of a conclusion that a transaction produces 
insurance rather than a reserve can be dramatic. The distinction 
may seem anomalous if one views the two payments as identical in 
amount and purpose. A closer look at the principles of risk transfer 
and risk distribution may clarify the policy behind the distinction. 
a. Risk Transfer 
The concept of risk transfer is that another person, and not the 
insured, must replace the insured as the bearer of the risk. This 
principle renders an alleged transfer of one's own risk to one's sub-
180 I.R.C. § 461(b) (1986). 
181 See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981). The essence of 
insurance is to transfer the financial risk of the covered event from the purchaser of the 
insurance to the seller of the insurance. Because self-insurance does not shift the risk to 
another corporation, from a tax policy point of view the self-insuring taxpayer has merely 
engaged in reserve accounting. 
182 Carnation Co. v. Commissioners, 71 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 400 (1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010 
(9th Cir. 1981). The rationale is that without both operational results the practical effect is 
merely self-insurance. 
183 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 1010 (1987). 
184 Jd.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1988). 
185 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Boylston Mkt. Ass'n, 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942). 
186 See generally Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934). 
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sidiary defective; the risk remains with the real party in interest. 
The IRS asserts that there is no risk transfer, and hence, no deduc-
tion, when a subsidiary company insures its parent company's risk. 187 
The Tax Court explicitly supports this view in the case of a wholly 
owned subsidiary that insures only its parent company's risk, and 
not the risk of unrelated companies. l88 But the Tax Court also sug-
gests that there may be risk transfer where at least fifty percent of 
the subsidiary company's premiums are received from unrelated 
companies. 189 
b. Risk Distribution 
The risk distribution effect of insurance operates through the 
diversification of risks. When the law of numbers applies, unusually 
favorable and unusually harmful experiences tend to balance each 
other. In theory, unless the pool contains a sufficient diversity of 
risks, the law of numbers cannot apply. 
The Tax Court asserts that all of the risks can be of a related 
corporation. 190 It has not said how many risks are enough or how 
one tells whether the law of numbers is operating; apparently the 
court would be satisfied by the application of insurance industry 
standards, whatever they may be. 191 For example, the Tax Court in 
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner relied heavily on the tax and nontax 
literature of the insurance industry for conceptual guidance and gave 
every indication that it would accept prevailing industry standards 
to solve the riddles of when there is enough diversification. 192 The 
court distinguished insurance from the establishment of reserves, 
indicating that additions to such reserves would be nondeductible. 193 
Another logical requirement for deduction is that the insurance 
company has to be reasonably able to pay if a casualty occurs.l94 If 
the "insurer" is unable to pay, in substance no insurance exists. This 
result relates to the principle of risk distribution, for only through 
187 Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53. The parent and subsidiary companies are considered 
to be members of the same economic family. Id. at 53-56. 
188 Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) 948 (1985), aff'd, 811 
F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987). 
189 Gulf Oil, 89 Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) at 1027 n.14. (relying on Rev. Rul. 80-120, 1980-1 C.B. 
41). The one-half figure is an arbitrary, Solomonic threshold. 
190 Id. at 1026. 
191 See id. at 1022-27. 
192 See id. at 1025-27 & nn.9-15. 
193 See id. at 1023-24, 1030. 
194 See O'Brien & Tung, Captive Off-Shore Insurance Corporations, 31 ANN. N.Y.U. TAX 
INST. 665, 684-85 (1973). 
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a pooling of premiums for diverse risks can the insuring entity 
acquire sufficient capital to cover a major loss. 
The situation in which there is virtual certainty that the risk will 
eventually materialize presents a teasing problem in the insurance 
area. In such cases, one would assume that a portion of the premiums 
is equivalent to a reserve for future expenses and should not be 
deductible. The insurance experts evidently think in terms of uncer-
tain risks,195 as opposed to certainties. One can insure, for example, 
the risk of a nuclear power plant being struck by lightning, as 
opposed to the plant gradually becoming radioactively "hot." One 
wonders if there might be borderline cases where some premiums 
that are really in the nature of reserves against sure things might 
be deductible as payments to cover uncertainties, for example, a 
policy that covered a nuclear power plant prematurely becoming 
"hot. "196 
Commercial coverage may become unavailable just when taxpay-
ers need it most. In recent years, for example, virtually no com-
mercial insurance has been available for environmental liabilities 
associated with industrial activity.197 If self-insurance and reserve 
accounting do not afford tax deductions for coverage of environmen-
tal risks, the economics of the particular situation may drive the 
taxpayer to risk all by "going bare"-not funding the risk. The risk 
may be attractive if a modestly capitalized subsidiary is used, 
thereby potentially minimizing the real economic risk to the tax-
payer. This highly undesirable outcome is exacerbated by state cor-
porate laws that enable shareholders to avoid personal liability for 
corporate acts and to drain the corporation of operating profits, 
leaving a "suit-proof" malfeasor. 
The potential of uninsured risks poses difficult policy choices. One 
alternative is to proscribe or sharply limit the activity that produces 
the risk. Another is to facilitate self-insurance by setting clear fed-
eral standards in the form of "safe harbor" rules, which, if satisfied, 
can assure the taxpayer that a deduction will be available. Opponents 
of such a scheme can be expected to argue that, if industry members 
are not willing to engage in risk-pooling on their own, the activity 
should not be subsidized. That argument fails, however, to take 
195 See A. WILLETT, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF RISK AND INSURANCE 72 (1951). 
196 There seem to be no litigated cases on point and the window of opportunity for crafty 
taxpayers seems narrow. 
197 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: ISSUES SUR-
ROUNDING INSURANCE A V AILABILITY 17-27 (1987). 
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account of the overall economic and social utility of the industry. 198 
It also overlooks the possibility of blending a variety of risks under 
one insurance premium, a step that is sometimes taken in the name 
of social policy even though it contradicts sound actuarial principles 
and full internalization of costs. Determining which economic activ-
ities to "subsidize" is, to be sure, a perplexing question as a matter 
of both theory and political choice. Its very perplexity suggests the 
desirability of reform through a specially tailored federal statute 
that balances the competing policies. 
Another approach would be to provide federal insurance against 
disasters involving toxic wastes, and to allow a tax deduction for 
contributions to purchase such insurance. The appeal of such an 
approach would be broad risk-pooling, with a greater likelihood of 
appropriate risk-shifting because the large number of participants 
should even out the actual types of liabilities that come home to 
roost as disasters. 
In this difficult and speculative field, two certainties stand out: (1) 
private insurance is frequently unavailable; and (2) barring scientific 
miracles, taxpayers will continue to conduct activities that will gen-
erate hazardous wastes and their attendant liabilities that our en-
vironmental, tort, and corporate laws cannot prevent. Providing 
federal insurance bends to those realities. The benefit is that the 
government as insurer can insist on appropriate minimum standards 
of conduct that should operate as a healthy control on irresponsible 
actors. In fact, if insurance is made a condition of permission to do 
business, and government insurance is available only upon compli-
ance with environmental regulations, polluters that fail to abide by 
the rules and thereby lose insurance coverage would be forced to 
shut down. 199 
The Code's application to environmental liability insurance is tra-
ditional. Section 162 deductions might be denied on indirect public 
198 For example, the nuclear weapons industry would probably adopt a more responsible 
attitude about health and environmental protection if government removed the shield of 
sovereign immunity. Without soverign immunity, private nuclear weapons contractors would 
need to cover new financial liabilities, but they would face the same obstacles to commercial 
insurance or risk pooling that their compatriots in the civilian nuclear energy industry faced 
and perhaps greater ones. 
199 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, for example, requires insurance coverage 
as a condition for receiving a permit to operate a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or 
disposal facility. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a), (t) (1986). The collapse of the commercial insurance 
market prevented some facilities from continuing to operate, leading in turn to a highly 
concentrated, essentially oligarchical, waste management industry. A government-run insur-
ance fund might have alleviated these problems and fostered a more competitive industrial 
structure, without any diminution in the efforts to protect the environment. 
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policy grounds as "extraordinary, "200 but that result is unlikely. 
Where insurance is unavailable, it may be wise to modify the Code 
to facilitate industry-wide risk-pooling mechanisms that would pro-
duce deductions for actuarially reasonable contributions to the pool. 
The fund might operate on a tax-deferred or currently taxable basis. 
Federal insurance could be provided selectively where the private 
market is unable to meet the demand for insurance from accepted, 
legitimate businesses. Premiums that paid for such insurance should 
be currently deductible. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The discord between generally accepted environmental values and 
statutorily prescribed environmental policies on the one hand, and 
the Code on the other, is remarkable. Major rE;!thinking of the rela-
tionship between the two is definitely in order. 
Formal institutional intervention to bring environmental policy 
objectives to the attention of the tax code writers is the first nec-
essary step. Tax legislative process should include an advisory ser-
vice whose role is to consider the environmental impact of future 
tax legislation. A good place to put the watchdog would be in the 
Joint Committee on Taxation. Candidates for the role of advisor 
include designated groups within the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, or perhaps the Congressional Research Service. Tax legisla-
tion originating in the Treasury Department should be reviewed by 
the President's Council on Environmental Quality before submission 
to Congress. For major proposals, a NEPA environmental impact 
statement should be prepared. 
In addition to making changes in the legislative process, Congress 
should amend several portions of the Code. In particular, no tax 
deduction should be allowed for business expenses that conflict with 
significant environmental policies. An amendment to section 162 of 
the Code to deny deductions for such expenditures could accomplish 
general conformity. The exact language of the amendment would 
have to be carefully worded to avoid de minimis cases and to keep 
pace with scientific and legislative developments. 
As part of the effort to resolve inconsistencies between the Code 
and environmental policies, Congress should also repeal percentage 
depletion for extracting asbestos and cut back or repeal the allow-
ances for extracting lead, mercury, uranium, and sulphur. In a better 
200 See text accompanying supra note 51. 
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world, Congress would limit aggregate percentage depletion in all 
cases to the taxpayer's investment in the mineral property. 
In addition to correcting negative tax consequences for the envi-
ronment, Congress should enact positive measures to induce safe 
and clean industrial procedures. Accordingly, while retaining the 
basic structure of section 169, Code revisions should enhance the 
incentives for installing new pollution control facilities. 
Finally, the IRS, in conjunction with Congress, should reconsider 
its approach to the reserve method of accruing liabilities for future 
pollution control activities. In general, the nuclear decommissioning 
rules provide an appropriate model in which current deductions are 
allowed for current cash contributions to a dedicated fund. The 
funds, however, should be placed beyond the reach of creditors. A 
federal deposit system would be one good way to assure that the 
funds are not deflected from their intended use. 
The intimate connection between tax and corporation laws compels 
a reevaluation of current laws on incorporation and corporate struc-
ture, as well as of the Code. Above all, the corporate laws relating 
to undercapitalized high liability subsidiaries should be modified. It 
should not be possible for a prosperous parent corporation to place 
its environmentally risky activities in a weakly capitalized subsid-
iary. Tax considerations are a minor factor here; this problem should 
be addressed head on with nontax legislation. 
Ultimately, as with most broad-scale social and economic activi-
ties, insurance against unexpected and unintended environmental 
consequences plays a significant role. For activities with high envi-
ronmental risk, pooled liability insurance arrangements should be 
encouraged. The real problems are not the tax law's restriction on 
the definition of deductible insurance payments, but the absence of 
reserve accounting and the collapse of the commercial market to 
insure against environmental hazards. In preference to a prolifera-
tion of uninsured risks, a federal insurance program should be cre-
ated to provide coverage against such liabilities. In addition, self-
insurance through establishing properly protected cash reserves can 
promote environmental protection and cleanup without disrupting 
accepted notions of insurable risks. 
This brief and selective overview of tax code implications for 
private actions to protect and improve the environment reveals a 
wealth of contradictions and disincentives. Although special taxes 
and fees can sometimes be used to promote very specific pollution 
control objectives, general tax policy cannot carry the burden of 
environmental policy. The endeavor of this Article has been to illu-
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minate some instances in which tax policy, usually inadvertently, 
works against important environmental policies that the United 
States is spending billions to accomplish. In the process, this Article 
has also uncovered some constructive elements in the Code that 
appear to facilitate sound industrial practices. What emerges most 
clearly from both the negative and the positive findings is the clear 
need to integrate environmental policy with the design and revision 
of the tax code. No federal law has the pervasive reach and the 
direct bottom-line impact of the tax code. As a result, it should be 
applied consciously and coherently to encourage and facilitate sound 
environmental practices in all areas of American business. 
